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Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (U.S.
2009).
William Larson*

I. Background
Coeur Alaska ("Coeur"), a silver and gold mining company, sought to
reopen the Kensington Gold Mine north of Juneau, Alaska. The mine had been
inactive since 1928 and Coeur hoped to make the mine profitable again by
using a mining technique known as "froth flotation". The procedure involved
churning crushed rock in tanks of frothing water. The water contained
chemicals that caused the gold-bearing minerals to rise to the surface. The gold
was then skimmed off the top of the mixture and “slurry”, a water based
mixture containing about 30 percent crushed rock by volume, remained in the
tanks after froth flotation. Coeur AK, Inc. v. Se. AK Conservation Council,
129 S.Ct. 2458, 2464 (2009). The dispute in this case revolved around the
this issue of which environmental agency had the authority to grant Coeur a
permit for the disposal of the mixture of slurry that remained in the tanks after
the process of froth flotation was complete and whether that agency followed
the correct procedures in granting the permit.
II. The Army Corps and the EPA
Instead of building a tailings pond, a manmade pond where slurry can
separate, Coeur’s plan was to dispose of the slurry in Lower Slate Lake.
Because the Lake is part of the Tongass National Forest and is a navigable
waterway it subject to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), a fact the parties did not
dispute. See id. Coeur expected to pump 4.5 million tons of tailings into the
lake, raising the lakebed 50 feet, while the mine was in operation. See id. This
process would have increased the lake’s area from 23 to approximately 60
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acres. See id. Coeur would then dam the lake water to separate it from the
groundwater and later purify the water before allowing it to go into a steam.
Coeur sought permits from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). The Corps granted a permit for
disposal of slurry in Lower Slate Lake under §404 of the CWA. See 86 Stat.
884; 33 U.S.C. §1344(a). The Corps understood the environmental damage,
which included destroying the lake’s fish, would be temporary and the water
would be treated under strict EPA criteria before flowing into downstream
waters. See Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2465. The alternative to disposing the slurry
in the Lower Slate Lake would be to place the tailings on wetlands, which
would in turn, destroy dozens of acres of wetlands permanently. See id. The
Corps determined that the plan to use Lower Slate Lake as a tailings pond was
the least environmentally damaging option when compared to the other
proposed alternatives. See Coeur, 128 S.Ct. at 2465. If the plan was
determined to have "an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water
supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas….wildlife, or recreational areas", the
EPA had the statutory authority to veto the permit under CWA §404(c). Id.
(quoting 33 U.S.C. §1344(c)). While the EPA did not think placing the tailings
in the lake was the "environmentally preferable" method, it not exercise its veto
power and deferred to the decision of the Corps. See Coeur, 128 S.Ct. at 2465.
III. The Dispute with SEACC
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council ("SEACC"), an environmental
protection organization, filed suit against the Corps in the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska. SEACC argued the permit violated the law
because Coeur should have sought a permit from the EPA under §402 of the
CWA and the discharge itself is unlawful in violation of the EPA new source
performance standard for froth-flotation gold mining. See id. at 2466. Coeur
and the State of Alaska intervened as defendants and both sides moved for
summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District
Court and ordered the court vacate the permit. "The Court of Appeals
concluded that Coeur Alaska required a §402 permit for its slurry discharge,
that the Corps lacked authority to issue such a permit under §404 and that the
proposed discharge was unlawful because it would violate the EPA new source
performance standard and §306(e)." Id. at 2467.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and considered
two questions: 1. "whether the Act gives authority to the United States Army
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Corps of Engineers, or instead to the [EPA], to issue a permit for the discharge
of mining waste, called slurry," and 2. "whether, when the Corps issued that
permit, the agency acted in accordance with the law". Coeur, 129 S.Ct. at
2463. The Opinion of the Court by Justice Kennedy reversed the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that the Corps had the proper authority
and lawfully issued the permit. See id.
IV. Corps Authority to Issue Permits for Slurry
SEACC argued that the CWA gave authority to the EPA and not the
Corps to issue a permit for slurry. The EPA’s permitting power stems from
§402, while the Corps permitting power stems from §404 of the CWA. The
Court reasoned that "[t]he EPA may not issue permits for fill material that fall
under the Corps’ §404 permitting authority. Id. at 2467. The corps, not the
EPA, has permit power under §404 for "fill material". See 33 U.S.C. §1344(a).
The Corps and the EPA define fill material as "any ‘material [that] has the
effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom elevation’ of the water." Coeur, 129 S. Ct.
at 2464 (quoting 40 CFR §232.2). They "further defined the ‘discharge of fill
material’ to include ‘placement of . . . slurry, or tailings or similar mining
related materials.’" Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting 40 CFR §232.2). The
parties agreed that slurry meets the definition of fill material. However, the
SEACC argued that §404 contains an implicit exception for material otherwise
subject to an EPA new source performance standard, standards promulgated for
new sources of pollutants. The Court noted that "§404 refers to all ‘fill
material’ without qualification," therefore the Corps maintains permitting
power. Coeur, 129 S.Ct. at 2469.
The EPA retains some control, because it writes the guidelines for the
Corps to follow in deciding whether to issue a permit for fill material and
§404(c) of the CWA gives the EPA the power to "prohibit" or veto a permit
issuance by the Corps for a particular disposal site. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b).
The Court concluded that the EPA’s regulations are clear "that ‘[d]ischarges of
dredged or fill material into waters of the United States which are regulated
under section 404 of CWA’ ‘do not require [§402] permits’ from the EPA."
Coeur, 129 S.Ct. 2467-68 (quoting 40 CFR §122.3). The Court held, the
Corps and not the EPA has the authority to permit Coeur’s slurry discharge.
See Coeur, 129 S.Ct. 2469.

CASE SUMMARIES

193
V. Corps Permit was Lawful

The SEACC argued "the slurry discharge will violate the EPA’s new
source performance standard and therefore the Corps permit is ‘unlawful’
[under] CWA §306(e)." Id. Petitioners "argue[d] that the permit is lawful
because the EPA performance standard, and §306(e), do not apply to fill
material regulated by the Corps." Id. The Court considered whether the EPA
performance standards and §306(e) apply to the fill material discharge.
The Court engaged in statutory interpretation to determine whether the
performance standards applied to fill material discharge. The Court determined
that neither the statute nor agency regulations resolved the ambiguity.
Petitioners argued the Court should follow an internal EPA memorandum, the
Regas Memorandum, which explains that the performance standards do not
apply because an EPA permit is not necessary for fill material discharges. See
id. at 2470. The memo asserts that because discharge is regulated under §404,
"the regulatory regime applicable to discharges under section 402 . . . such as
those applicable to gold ore mining" do not apply. Id. at 1273 (quoting App.
144a–145a). Meanwhile respondents argue the memorandum "is not entitled to
deference because it contradicts the agencies’ published statements and prior
practice." Id. The Court determined the memorandum was not entitled to
Mead deference, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–38
(2001), deference granted to agencies in rule-making, but was "entitled to a
measure of deference because it interprets the agencies’ own regulatory
scheme." Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). The deference was
further warranted because the interpretation was "reasonable" and consistent
with the regulations. See Coeur, 129 S.Ct. at 2473. The Court also considered
that "the Memorandum preserves a role for the EPA’s performance standard,"
acknowledges the discharger did not try to evade the EPA’s performance
standard, "preserves the Corps’ authority to determine whether a discharge is in
the public interest," prohibits toxic pollutants from entering navigable waters,
and is "a sensible and rational construction that reconciles §§206, 402, and
404." Id. at 2473–74. Furthermore, the Court looked to Congress’s omission
of §306 under §404 in contrast to its inclusion in §402(k) as "evidence that
Congress did not intend §306(e) to apply to Corps §404 permits or to
discharges of fill material." Coeur, 129 S.Ct. at 2471. The statutory
construction along with the Regas Memorandum led the Court to find the
agency’s practice reasonable and not unlawful.
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VI. Concurring Opinion

Justice Breyer joined the opinion of the Court and concurred in the
judgment, but added that the issue before the Court was "the kind of detailed
decision that the statutes delegate authority to the EPA, not the courts, to make
(subject to the bounds of reasonableness)." Id. at 2479. Justice Scalia also
concurred in judgment and joined the opinion of the Court "except for its
protestation" that deference should be accorded the Regas Memorandum. Id.
VII. Dissent
Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Stevens and Souter dissented. The
dissenters assert the proper question is whether “a pollutant discharge
prohibited under §306 of the Act [is] eligible for a §404 permit as discharge of
fill material.” Id. at 2480. They concluded the discharge was not eligible for a
permit under §404 of the CWA. Focusing on the intent of the CWA they assert
that "[t]he use of waters of the United States as ‘settling ponds’ for harmful
mining waste . . . is antithetical to the text, structure, and purpose of the Clean
Water Act." Id. at 2484.

